Quantum contextuality implies a logic that does not obey the principle
  of bivalence by Bolotin, Arkady
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
07
39
0v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
30
 Ju
l 2
01
8
Quantum contextuality implies a logic that does not obey the
principle of bivalence
Arkady Bolotin∗
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheba (Israel)
July 31, 2018
Abstract
In the paper, a value assignment for projection operators relating to a quantum system is
equated with assignment of truth-values to the propositions associated with these operators.
In consequence, the Kochen-Specker theorem (its localized variant, to be exact) can be treated
as the statement that a logic of those projection operators does not obey the principle of bi-
valence. This implies that such a logic has a gappy (partial) semantics or many-valued semantics.
Keywords: Quantum mechanics; Kochen-Specker theorem; Contextuality; Truth values; Par-
tial semantics; Many-valued semantics.
1 Introduction
Consider the triple (H, |Ψ〉,O) in which H is the Hilbert space of a quantum system, |Ψ〉 ∈ H is
the normalized vector describing the state of this system, and O = {Pˆ} is a finite set of projection
operators Pˆ on H.
Define an assignment function h as a function from the set O to the set of numerical values {0, 1},
namely,
h : O → {0, 1} , (1)
such that
h(0ˆ) = 0 , (2)
h(1ˆ) = 1 , (3)
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where 0ˆ and 1ˆ are the zero-projection and identity-projection operators, respectively. According to
[1], the assignment function h expresses the notion of a hidden variable, namely, h(Pˆ ) specifies in
advance the result obtained from the measurement of an observable corresponding to the particular
projection operator Pˆ .
Also, define a subset C ⊂ O as a context if |C| ≥ 2 and any two projection operators from C, say,
Pˆi and Pˆj , are orthogonal
Pˆi, Pˆj ∈ C, i 6= j =⇒ PˆiPˆj = PˆjPˆi = 0ˆ . (4)
The context C is maximal (or complete) if the projection operators from C resolve to the identity-
projection operator:
∑
Pˆi ∈C
Pˆi = 1ˆ . (5)
Now consider the following sentences:
(a) The set O is value definite under h; in other words, h is a total function.
(b) The value h(Pˆi) depends only on Pˆi and not the context C containing Pˆi.
(c) For a maximal C, the values of its projection operators h(Pˆi) add up to 1; otherwise stated,
the next entailment holds:
h

∑
Pˆi ∈C
Pˆi

=1 =⇒ ∑
Pˆi ∈C
h
(
Pˆi
)
=1 . (6)
Provided that the sentences (b) and (c) are true, the sentence (a) must be denied in accordance
with the Kochen-Specker theorem [2, 3]. That is, the assignment function h cannot be total and,
hence, at least one projection operator from O must be value indefinite under h (i.e., must have
the value neither 0 nor 1). What is more, according to the variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem
localizing value indefiniteness [4], there is a set O containing projection operators Pˆi and Pˆj such
that if the system is prepared in the pure state |Ψi〉 in which h(Pˆi) = 1, then both h(Pˆj) = 1 and
h(Pˆj) = 0 lead to contradictions.
On the other hand, consider a truth-value assignment function vC that denotes a truth valuation
in a circumstance C, that is, a mapping from some subset of propositions P ⊆ {⋄} related to the
quantum system (where the symbol ⋄ stands for any proposition, compound or simple) to the set of
truth-values {0, 1} (where the value 0 represents “false” and the value 1 represents “true”) relative
to a circumstance of valuation indicated by C (such a circumstance can be, for example, the state
|Ψ〉 in which the system is prepared or found):
vC : P → {0, 1} . (7)
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Commonly, it is written using the double-bracket notation, namely, vC(⋄) = [[⋄]]C . The truth-value
assignment function vC expresses the notion of not-yet-verified truth values: It specifies in advance
the truth-value obtained from the verification of the proposition ⋄.
Let the following valuational axiom hold true
vC(Pˆ⋄) = [[⋄]]C , (8)
where Pˆ⋄ is the projection operator uniquely (i.e., one-to-one) associated with the proposition
⋄ ∈ {⋄}.
Assume that the function h coincides with the function vC . Then, the localized variant of the
Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to the statement that a logic defined as the relations be-
tween projection operators Pˆ⋄ on H does not obey the principle of bivalence (according to which a
proposition must be either true or false [5]). In other words, a logic of the projection operators Pˆ⋄
has a non-bivalent semantics, e.g., a gappy one (in which the function vC is partial and thus some
propositions may have absolutely no truth-value) or a many-valued one (in which there are more
than two truth-values).
Let us demonstrate this equivalence in the presented paper.
2 Truth-value assignment for projection operators
Consider the lattice L(C) formed by the column spaces (a.k.a. ranges) of the projection operators
Pˆi ∈ C, the closed subspaces of the Hilbert space H. Let the lattice operation meet ∧ correspond to
the intersection of the column spaces, while the lattice operation join ∨ correspond to the smallest
closed subspace of H containing their union. Let the lattice L(C) be bounded, i.e., let it have the
greatest element ran(1ˆ) = H and the least element ran(0ˆ) = {0}.
One can define the lattice operations on L(C) as follows:
ran(Aˆ) ∧ ran(Bˆ) = ran(Aˆ) ∩ ran(Bˆ) = ran(AˆBˆ) , (9)
ran(Aˆ) ∨ ran(Bˆ) =
((
ran(Aˆ)
)⊥
∩
(
ran(Bˆ)
)⊥)⊥
, (10)
where ran(Aˆ), ran(Bˆ) ∈ L(C) and (·)⊥ stands for the orthogonal complement of (·). Given that the
orthogonal complement of the column space is the null space (a.k.a. kernel), that is,
(
ran(Aˆ)
)⊥
= ker(Aˆ) = ran(¬Aˆ) , (11)
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where
¬Aˆ = 1ˆ− Aˆ (12)
is understood as negation of Aˆ such that
ran(Aˆ) + ran(¬Aˆ) = ran(1ˆ) = ran(Aˆ+ ¬Aˆ) , (13)
it holds that
ran(Aˆ) ∨ ran(Bˆ) =
(
ran(¬Aˆ¬Bˆ)
)⊥
= ran(Aˆ+ Bˆ) . (14)
As the closed subspaces ran(Pˆi) and ran(Pˆj) where Pˆi ⊥ Pˆj , i.e., PˆiPˆj = 0ˆ, are orthogonal to each
other, one finds
ran(Pˆi) ∧ ran(Pˆj) = ran(Pˆi) ∩ ran(Pˆj) = {0} . (15)
Next, let us consider the truth-value assignments of the projection operators from the lattice L(C).
Given that ran(1ˆ) = H, any arbitrary state of the system |Ψ〉 ∈ H resides in the column space of
the identity-projection operator, i.e., |Ψ〉 ∈ ran(1ˆ). But then, being in ran(Pˆ⋄) means Pˆ⋄|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉;
so, in agreement with the eigenstate assumption [1], one can presume that the function v|Ψ〉 assigns
the truth value 1 to the projection operator 1ˆ in any admissible state of the system |Ψ〉 ∈ H.
At the same time, any admissible state of the system |Ψ〉 ∈ H also resides in the null space of the
null-projection operator, i.e., |Ψ〉 ∈ ran(¬0ˆ). It gives 0ˆ|Ψ〉 = 0 · |Ψ〉, consequently, one can presume
that the function v|Ψ〉 assigns the truth value 0 to 0ˆ in any admissible state of the system |Ψ〉 ∈ H.
This can be written down as
|Ψ〉 ∈
{
ran(1ˆ) = H
ran(¬0ˆ) = H
⇐⇒
{
v|Ψ〉(1ˆ) = 1
v|Ψ〉(0ˆ) = 0
. (16)
Let the system be prepared in a pure state |Ψi〉 lying in the column space of the projection operator
Pˆi ∈ C. Since Pˆi|Ψi〉 = |Ψi〉, one can assume that the function v|Ψi〉 assigns the truth value 1 to the
projection operator Pˆi in the state |Ψi〉. Contrariwise, if the truth value of the projection operator
Pˆi is 1 in the state |Ψi〉, one can deduce that the state |Ψi〉 is in the column space of the projection
operator Pˆi. These two suppositions can be recorded together as the following logical biconditional:
|Ψi〉 ∈ ran(Pˆi) ⇐⇒ v|Ψi〉(Pˆi) = 1 . (17)
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In view of (15), the the vector |Ψi〉 must also reside in the null space of any other projection
operator Pˆj in the context C, and therefore all other truth values v|Ψi〉(Pˆj) relating to the context
C must be zero:
|Ψi〉 ∈ ran(¬Pˆj) ⇐⇒ v|Ψi〉(Pˆj) = 0 . (18)
This obviously gives
v|Ψi〉(Pˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
∑
j 6=i
v|Ψi〉(Pˆj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 1 . (19)
By contrast, consider the state |Φi〉 where v|Φi〉(Pˆi) = 0 implying |Φi〉 ∈ ran(¬Pˆi). According to
(9), in the maximal context C there is another Pˆk, k 6= i, such that
ran(¬Pˆi) ∩ ran(Pˆk) = ran(¬PˆiPˆk) = ran
(
(1ˆ− Pˆi)Pˆk
)
= ran(Pˆk) , (20)
and so
|Φi〉 ∈ ran(¬Pˆi) ⊆ ran(Pˆk) ⇐⇒ v|Ψi〉(¬Pˆi) = v|Ψi〉(Pˆk) = 1 , (21)
v|Φi〉(Pˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ v|Φi〉(Pˆk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
∑
 6=i, k
v|Φi〉(Pˆj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 1 . (22)
Subsequently, if the system is prepared (found) in the state lying in the column or null space of
any projection operator from the maximal context C, then among all the propositions PC = {⋄}C
associated with C exactly one would be true while the others would be false.
Assume that there is a different context C′ ⊂ O, where some members Pˆ ′i ∈ C
′ do not commute
with Pˆi ∈ C. Suppose that the state |Ω〉 is arranged in the subspace from the lattice L(C
′), e.g.,
|Ω〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ ′l ), entailing v|Ω〉(Pˆ
′
l ) = 1 and v|Ω〉(¬Pˆ
′
l ) = 0.
Let us show that the vector |Ω〉 resides in neither the column space nor the null space of at least one
projection operator, say, Pˆl, from the other lattice L(C) and, as a result, the truth-value function
v|Ω〉(Pˆl) must assign neither 1 nor 0 to this operator under the valuations (17) and (18), that is,
|Ω〉 /∈
{
ran(Pˆl)
ran(¬Pˆl)
⇐⇒ v|Ω〉(Pˆl) /∈ {0, 1} . (23)
5
3 Cabello’s set of 4×4 matrices
Consider the projection operators Pˆ
(1)
i ∈ C
(1) and Pˆ
(6)
i ∈ C
(6) on the Hilbert space H = C4 from
the set O = {C(Q)}9Q=1 of 18 four-dimensional matrices used in the paper [6] by Cabello et al. to
prove the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem:
Pˆ
(1)
1 =


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

 , Pˆ (1)2 =


0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 , Pˆ (1)3 = 12


1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0

 , Pˆ (1)4 = 12


1 0 1¯ 0
0 0 0 0
1¯ 0 1 0
0 0 0 0

 , (24)
Pˆ
(6)
1 =
1
4


1 1¯ 1¯ 1
1¯ 1 1 1¯
1¯ 1 1 1¯
1 1¯ 1¯ 1

 , Pˆ (6)2 = 14


1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1

 , Pˆ (6)3 = 12


1 0 0 1¯
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1¯ 0 0 1

 , Pˆ (6)4 = 12


0 0 0 0
0 1 1¯ 0
0 1¯ 1 0
0 0 0 0

 , (25)
where 1¯ stands for −1.
As it can be readily seen, all Pˆ
(1)
i are orthogonal to each other and
∑4
i=1 Pˆ
(1)
i = 1ˆ. The same is
true for Pˆ
(6)
i , which means that C
(1) and C(6) are the maximal contexts. Their column and null
spaces are:
ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) =




0
0
0
a

 : a ∈ R

 , ran(¬Pˆ
(1)
1 ) =




b
c
d
0

 : b, c, d ∈ R

 , (26)
ran(Pˆ
(1)
2 ) =




0
a
0
0

 : a ∈ R

 , ran(¬Pˆ
(1)
2 ) =




b
0
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R

 , (27)
ran(Pˆ
(1)
3 ) =




0
0
a
0

 : a ∈ R

 , ran(¬Pˆ
(1)
3 ) =




−c
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R

 , (28)
ran(Pˆ
(1)
4 ) =




a
0
−a
0

 : a ∈ R

 , ran(¬Pˆ
(1)
4 ) =




c
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R

 ; (29)
ran(Pˆ
(6)
1 ) =




a
−a
−a
a

 : a ∈ R

 , ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
1 ) =




b+ c− d
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R

 , (30)
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ran(Pˆ
(6)
2 ) =




a
a
a
a

 : a ∈ R

 , ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
2 ) =




−b− c− d
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R

 , (31)
ran(Pˆ
(6)
3 ) =




a
0
0
−a

 : a ∈ R

 , ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
3 ) =




d
b
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R

 , (32)
ran(Pˆ
(6)
4 ) =




0
a
−a
0

 : a ∈ R

 , ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
4 ) =




b
c
c
d

 : b, c, d ∈ R

 . (33)
Let the system be prepared in the state |1(1)〉 lying in the column space of the projection operator
Pˆ
(1)
1 and so in the null spaces of the rest of the projections from the context C
(1), which, in
accordance with (17) and (18), implies
|1(1)〉 ∈




0
0
0
a



 =⇒ v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) = 1 , (34)
|1(1)〉 ∈






b
c
0
d



 =⇒ v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(1)
2 ) = 0




−c
b
c
d



 =⇒ v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(1)
3 ) = 0




c
b
c
d



 =⇒ v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(1)
4 ) = 0
. (35)
In consequence,
∑4
i=1 v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(1)
i ) = 1.
Consider the intersections
ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) ∩ ran(Pˆ
(6)
1 ) =




0
0
0
a



 ∩




a
−a
−a
a



 = {0} , (36)
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ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) ∩ ran(Pˆ
(6)
2 ) =




0
0
0
a



 ∩




a
a
a
a



 = {0} , (37)
ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) ∩ ran(Pˆ
(6)
3 ) =




0
0
0
a



 ∩




a
0
0
−a



 = {0} , (38)
ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) ∩ ran(Pˆ
(6)
4 ) =




0
0
0
a



 ∩




0
a
−a
0



 = {0} . (39)
Because every one of these intersections is the zero subspace, ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) is orthogonal to every
ran(Pˆ
(6)
i ) and, hence, v|1(1)〉(¬Pˆ
(1)
1 ) = v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i ) = 0. However, this leads to a contradiction,
namely, v|1(1)〉(
∑4
i=1 Pˆ
(6)
i ) = 1 =
∑4
i=1 v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i ) = 0.
Now, consider additional intersections:
ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) ∩ ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
1 ) =




0
0
0
a



 ∩




b+ c− d
b
c
d



 = {0} , (40)
ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) ∩ ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
2 ) =




0
0
0
a



 ∩




−b− c− d
b
c
d



 = {0} , (41)
ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) ∩ ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
3 ) =




0
0
0
a



 ∩




d
b
c
d



 = {0} , (42)
ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) ∩ ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
4 ) =




0
0
0
a



 ∩




b
c
c
d



 =




0
0
0
a



 =⇒




0
0
0
a



 ⊆




b
c
c
d



 . (43)
From these intersections it follows that v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4) = 1 and v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
4 ) = 0. But this leads to
another contradiction, namely, v|1(1)〉(
∑4
i=1 Pˆ
(6)
i ) = 1 =
∑4
i=1 v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i ) = 3.
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So, if the system is prepared in the pure state |1(1)〉 in which v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(1)
1 ) = 1, both v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4) = 1
and v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4) = 0 lead to contradictions. Hence, Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4 must be value indefinite under v|1(1)〉, that
is,
|1(1)〉 /∈
{
ran(Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4)
ran(¬Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4)
⇐⇒ v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4) /∈ {0, 1} . (44)
4 Interpretation of the Kochen-Specker theorem
The failure of being a total function for the evaluation relation v|1(1)〉 : {Pˆ
(6)
i } → {0, 1} can be
described by way of the truth-value gaps, namely,
|Ω〉 /∈
{
ran(Pˆ⋄)
ran(¬Pˆ⋄)
⇐⇒
{
v|Ω〉(Pˆ⋄)
}
= ∅ . (45)
This expression means that in a state |Ω〉 not residing in the column or null space of a projection
operator Pˆ⋄, a proposition ⋄ associated with Pˆ⋄ has no truth-value at all, i.e., {[[⋄]]|Ω〉} = ∅. A
semantics defined by set of these truth-value gaps in conjunction with the valuations (17) and (18)
is gappy and yet two-valued. Accordingly, it can be called a supervaluationist semantics (for details
of such semantics see [7, 8] and also [9, 10]).
This semantics is, in general, not truth-functional : Thus, according to (17), (18) and (45), in any
admissible state of the system, the truth-value assignment function assigns the value of the truth
to the sum of the projection operators Pˆ⋄ in a maximal context C, even though there is a state |Ω〉
where at least one of these projection operators has no truth-value:
v|Ω〉(1ˆ) = 1
{v|Ω〉(Pˆ⋄)} = ∅
}
=⇒
v|Ω〉
(∑
Pˆ⋄∈C
Pˆ⋄
)
= 1{∑
Pˆ⋄∈C
v|Ω〉(Pˆ⋄)
}
= ∅
. (46)
For example, the values v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4) are nonexistent within the supervaluationist semantics, and
so {
∑4
i=1 v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i )} = ∅.
Alternatively, the failure of the principle of bivalence can be described using a multivalued semantics
in which projection operators Pˆ may have more than two values, specifically,
vC : {Pˆ} → VN , (47)
where VN denotes a set of truth-values whose cardinality is N > 2 and whose upper and lower
bounds are 1 (that represents “true” or “absolutely true”) and 0 (that represents “false” or “abso-
lutely false”), respectively.
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To accomplish that, instead of the truth-value gaps (45) one can introduce the following valuation
|Ω〉 /∈
{
ran(Pˆ⋄)
ran(¬Pˆ⋄)
⇐⇒ v|Ω〉(Pˆ⋄) = 〈Ω|Pˆ⋄|Ω〉 ∈ {x ∈ R | 0 < x < 1} , (48)
where the function v|Ω〉 is determined by the probability P[[[⋄]]|Ω〉=1] = 〈Ω|Pˆ⋄|Ω〉. As it is said in
[11, 12] the value v|Ω〉(Pˆ⋄) represents the degree to which the projection operator Pˆ⋄ ∈ C has the
value 1 in the state |Ω〉. Because 〈Ω|Pˆ⋄|Ω〉 ∈ [0, 1], a semantics defined by the set of the valuations
(17), (18) and (48) is infinite-valued.
For example, in the infinite-valued semantics, the values v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i 6=4) are defined by v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
1 ) =
v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
2 ) =
1
4 and v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
3 ) =
1
2 inferring
∑4
i=1 v|1(1)〉(Pˆ
(6)
i ) = 1. This shows that despite its
value indefiniteness under the bivaluation, the context C(6) is value definite under the infinite-valued
assignment (48).
Hence, only within the supervaluationist semantics, the negation of the sentence (a) (i.e., the prin-
ciple of bivalence) can be interpreted as a sign that the verification of the “gappy” (i.e., having
no truth-values) propositions must result in the ex nihilo creation of the bivalent values of these
propositions.
While on the contrary, in the many-valued semantics, the failure of bivalence implies that non-
classical (i.e., different from 1 and 0) truth-values must exist before the verification and they
become bivalent as a result of the verification (thus, a bivalent semantic merely emerges at the end
of the verification process). In such a sense, one may say that the measurements (verifications)
produce the output that yield pre-existing elements of physical reality.
For that reason, the Kochen-Specker theorem (along with its localized variant) cannot justify the
belief that quantum mechanics is indeterministic, that is, that there are no hidden variables (or
not-yet-verified truth values of the propositions) determining somehow the outcome of a measure-
ment (verification) in advance. This theorem only shows that if those hidden variables were to
exist, they would have to comply with a logic which does not obey the principle of bivalence.
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